The Epistemic Status of Processing Fluency as Source for Judgments of Truth

This article combines findings from cognitive psychology on the role of processing fluency in truth judgments with epistemological theory on justification of belief. We first review evidence that repeated exposure to a statement increases the subjective ease with which that statement is processed. This increased processing fluency, in turn, increases the probability that the statement is judged to be true. The basic question discussed here is whether the use of processing fluency as a cue to truth is epistemically justified. In the present analysis, based on Bayes’ Theorem, we adopt the reliable-process account of justification presented by Goldman (1986) and show that fluency is a reliable cue to truth, under the assumption that the majority of statements one has been exposed to are true. In the final section, we broaden the scope of this analysis and discuss how processing fluency as a potentially universal cue to judged truth may contribute to cultural differences in commonsense beliefs

Modeling the Violation of Reward Maximization and Invariance in Reinforcement Schedules

It is often assumed that animals and people adjust their behavior to maximize reward acquisition. In visually cued reinforcement schedules, monkeys make errors in trials that are not immediately rewarded, despite having to repeat error trials. Here we show that error rates are typically smaller in trials equally distant from reward but belonging to longer schedules (referred to as “schedule length effect”). This violates the principles of reward maximization and invariance and cannot be predicted by the standard methods of Reinforcement Learning, such as the method of temporal differences. We develop a heuristic model that accounts for all of the properties of the behavior in the reinforcement schedule task but whose predictions are not different from those of the standard temporal difference model in choice tasks. In the modification of temporal difference learning introduced here, the effect of schedule length emerges spontaneously from the sensitivity to the immediately preceding trial. We also introduce a policy for general Markov Decision Processes, where the decision made at each node is conditioned on the motivation to perform an instrumental action, and show that the application of our model to the reinforcement schedule task and the choice task are special cases of this general theoretical framework. Within this framework, Reinforcement Learning can approach contextual learning with the mixture of empirical findings and principled assumptions that seem to coexist in the best descriptions of animal behavior. As examples, we discuss two phenomena observed in humans that often derive from the violation of the principle of invariance: “framing,” wherein equivalent options are treated differently depending on the context in which they are presented, and the “sunk cost” effect, the greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made. The schedule length effect might be a manifestation of these phenomena in monkeys

Context-dependent preferences in starlings: linking ecology, foraging and choice

Foraging animals typically encounter opportunities that they either pursue or skip, but occasionally meet several alternatives simultaneously. Behavioural ecologists predict preferences using absolute properties of each option, while decision theorists focus on relative evaluations at the time of choice. We use European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) to integrate ecological reasoning with decision models, linking and testing hypotheses for value acquisition and choice mechanism. We hypothesise that options' values depend jointly on absolute attributes, learning context, and subject's state. In simultaneous choices, preference could result either from comparing subjective values using deliberation time, or from processing each alternative independently, without relative comparisons. The combination of the value acquisition hypothesis and independent processing at choice time has been called the Sequential Choice Model. We test this model with options equated in absolute properties to exclude the possibility of preference being built at the time of choice. Starlings learned to obtain food by responding to four stimuli in two contexts. In context [AB], they encountered options A5 or B10 in random alternation; in context [CD], they met C10 or D20. Delay to food is denoted, in seconds, by the suffixes. Observed latency to respond (Li) to each option alone (our measure of value) ranked thus: LA≈LC<LB<<LD, consistently with value being sensitive to both delay and learning context. We then introduced simultaneous presentations of A5 vs. C10 and B10 vs. C10, using latencies in no-choice tests to predict sign and strength of preference in pairings. Starlings preferred A5 over C10 and C10 over B10. There was no detectable evaluation time, and preference magnitude was predictable from latency differentials. This implies that value reflects learning rather than choice context, that preferences are not constructed by relative judgements at the time of choice, and that mechanisms adapted for sequential decisions are effective to predict choice behaviour.This work was supported by Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC) Grant BB/G007144/1 to AK www.bbsrc.ac.uk; TM was supported by a Doctoral Grant from the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) www.fct.pt/index.phtml.en. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript

Implicit Essentialism: Genetic Concepts Are Implicitly Associated with Fate Concepts

Genetic essentialism is the tendency for people to think in more essentialist ways upon encountering genetic concepts. The current studies assessed whether genetic essentialist biases would also be evident at the automatic level. In two studies, using different versions of the Implicit Association Test [1], we found that participants were faster to categorize when genes and fate were linked, compared to when these two concepts were kept separate and opposing. In addition to the wealth of past findings of genetic essentialism with explicit and deliberative measures, these biases appear to be also evident with implicit measure

Do Author-Suggested Reviewers Rate Submissions More Favorably than Editor-Suggested Reviewers? A Study on Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics

Background: Ratings in journal peer review can be affected by sources of bias. The bias variable investigated here was the information on whether authors had suggested a possible reviewer for their manuscript, and whether the editor had taken up that suggestion or had chosen a reviewer that had not been suggested by the authors. Studies have shown that authorsuggested reviewers rate manuscripts more favorably than editor-suggested reviewers do. Methodology/Principal Findings: Reviewers ’ ratings on three evaluation criteria and the reviewers ’ final publication recommendations were available for 552 manuscripts (in total 1145 reviews) that were submitted to Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, an interactive open access journal using public peer review (authors ’ and reviewers ’ comments are publicly exchanged). Public peer review is supposed to bring a new openness to the reviewing process that will enhance its objectivity. In the statistical analysis the quality of a manuscript was controlled for to prevent favorable reviewers ’ ratings from being attributable to quality instead of to the bias variable. Conclusions/Significance: Our results agree with those from other studies that editor-suggested reviewers rated manuscripts between 30 % and 42 % less favorably than author-suggested reviewers. Against this backdrop journal editors should consider either doing without the use of author-suggested reviewers or, if they are used, bringing in more than one editor-suggested reviewer for the review process (so that the review by author-suggested reviewers can be put i

A short educational intervention diminishes causal illusions and specific paranormal beliefs in undergraduates

Cognitive biases such as causal illusions have been related to paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs and, thus, pose a real threat to the development of adequate critical thinking abilities. We aimed to reduce causal illusions in undergraduates by means of an educational intervention combining training-in-bias and training-in-rules techniques. First, participants directly experienced situations that tend to induce the Barnum effect and the confirmation bias. Thereafter, these effects were explained and examples of their influence over everyday life were provided. Compared to a control group, participants who received the intervention showed diminished causal illusions in a contingency learning task and a decrease in the precognition dimension of a paranormal belief scale. Overall, results suggest that evidence-based educational interventions like the one presented here could be used to significantly improve critical thinking skills in our students

Standards and Practices for Forecasting

One hundred and thirty-nine principles are used to summarize knowledge about forecasting. They cover formulating a problem, obtaining information about it, selecting and applying methods, evaluating methods, and using forecasts. Each principle is described along with its purpose, the conditions under which it is relevant, and the strength and sources of evidence. A checklist of principles is provided to assist in auditing the forecasting process. An audit can help one to find ways to improve the forecasting process and to avoid legal liability for poor forecasting